“What we can do is try to encourage these folks to de-escalate a little bit,” Vice President J.D. Vance said on Fox News, “but we’re not going to get involved in the middle of a war that’s fundamentally none of our business and has nothing to do with America’s ability to control it.” This echoes an earlier comment from the president himself, “They’ve gotten tit for tat, so hopefully they can stop now. And if I can do anything to help, I will be there.”
One is tempted to pull a Vladimir Putin and start explaining this conflict with reference to the invasion of India by Mahmud of Ghazni in 1027 AD, but that is irrelevant. The current conflict is more strategic than religious. Pakistan, after losing conventional wars with India, encouraged Kashmiri separatism, which resulted in a simmering sub-conventional conflict that is now in its fifth decade. The proximate cause of this recent bout is, as always, a terrorist attack in the tourist hotspot of Kashmir that killed a lot of Indian tourists; men were targeted and women spared. The Indian initial operation was named as Operation Sindoor (“vermillion”), after the red dye worn by Hindu women, a new religious symbolism that was hitherto unseen in the relatively secular, British-designed Indian armed-forces nomenclature, compared to the more overtly religious Pakistani operations in the past.
The trajectory of the conflict is different from previous bouts. Initial reports suggest that Indians struck some cities in Pakistan, where they claimed there were terrorist training grounds. In retaliation, the Pakistanis flew their air assets close to the border; the Indians followed suit, and both sides fired stand-off Beyond-Visual-Range (BVR) weapons without crossing the international boundaries. The Indians apparently flew their French-made Rafales, and some, numbers still unconfirmed, were lost to Chinese-made Pakistani jets and air defense systems. Given the loss, the chances of an off-ramp were finished, and the conflict has now escalated to its third night of cross-border fighting with increasingly sophisticated weaponry being used. It has also taken some international color. Online flame wars have started between the Turkish diaspora and the Greeks and Israelis, taking the conflict as a proxy for their own rivalries. Meanwhile, both the French and Americans are probably waiting for intel assessment from the Indians about Chinese weapons’ performance.
It is hard to understand where this conflict is going or what are the strategic end-games of either side. The Indian claim of “establishing deterrence” doesn’t explain what the endgame of its escalation dominance might be. Pakistan isn’t Gaza, and India, while conventionally superior over its enemy in every way, doesn’t enjoy the total military dominance of the theater to coerce or compel change in Pakistani behavior. The only way to do that would be to push for a repeat of 1971 and initiate a full-spectrum invasion. Without an invasion of Pakistan, or a siege of the Pakistani economic jugular of Karachi by the Indian navy, this conflict will not reach a point where there might be enough launch pressure for talks. Nuclear war is out of the question, despite the obscenely jingoistic social media of both sides, and the political leaders know that, demonstrated by the constant statements about how “non-escalatory” and “proportionate” the strikes are.
In 2001, immediately after the attack on the Indian parliament, the two sides mobilized around a million men to the border, the U.S. administration officials and diplomats were jolted by the blunt talk of nuclear war from the Indian side. “If we go to war, jolly good!” Gen. S. Padmanabhan, then commander of the armed services, said to a baffled American reporter.
Commenting on Indian second-strike capabilities, the general commented, “The perpetrator of that particular outrage shall be punished so severely that their continuation thereafter in any form of fray will be doubtful. We are ready for a second strike, yes.”
He added, “Take it from me, we have enough.”
Mercifully, this time the official statements are more measured. But that also shows the limited U.S. interest in the conflict, other than coaxing the two sides towards peace. In fact, Vance officially mentioning neutrality is in itself a change in historic U.S. posture, which, during the Cold War, traditionally favored Pakistan—a sign that in this new scenario neither side is an ally. The only material concerns for the U.S. are avoiding a nuclear war that would make the air of Asia unbreathable, studying the best of Western weapons performing against the best of Chinese-made weapons, and watching drones perform in a peer conflict. So far, it appears that Chinese platforms are getting the best of things, which might send a chill down the spine of Pentagon top brass. It might also discourage the talk of a French security umbrella over the EU, as well as French talk of European strategic autonomy.
Other than that, the U.S. admin would be wise to remember the words of Padmanabhan from 2001: “When two wild bulls decide to fight in a jungle, they carry on regardless.”
Read the full article here
