Americans, Venezuelans, and international observers alike were stunned by the daring night raid on Caracas that resulted in the capture of Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro, decapitating the government and demonstrating the absolute superiority of American arms and special operations units. The strongman was carted back to the United States in chains (and a surprisingly stylish outfit) and literally paraded through the streets of New York City. Trump announced to the world that the U.S. would thereafter be taking control of Venezuela’s oil supplies and running the country.
At first, it wasn’t clear what that meant for Venezuela, but it soon became evident that the Trump administration was happy to work with Maduro’s vice president, Delcy Rodríguez, whose government continues to operate under an American sword of Damocles. The Delcy government has freed political prisoners and reestablished diplomatic relations with the U.S. It’s even held a series of talks with American officials—including Energy Secretary Chris Wright and, most recently, Secretary of the Interior Doug Burgum—on integrating Venezuela back into the American economy and revitalizing the country’s degraded oil industry under U.S. control.
The shocking success of the military operation and the relative ease with which the U.S. has dealt with the remaining government were a political coup for the administration, creating the impression among some commentators that the issue has been settled and the Trump administration can declare victory in Venezuela once and for all. That is, unfortunately, very much not the case. The capture of Maduro was but one step on a long road that remains fraught with hazards. Until the U.S. and Venezuela reach the end of that road, we can’t say the raid was effective in creating a stable bilateral relationship.
Perhaps the biggest danger pertains to a possible transition to democracy. The Trump administration has at least gestured towards some kind of democratization of Venezuela. Although the administration appears perfectly content to continue working with the current government for the foreseeable future, it is under consistent pressure from powerful constituencies on the right to call for elections and normalize the political situation in the country.
A push to topple the remainder of the socialist Chavista regime would completely destroy the superficial stability Venezuela has achieved post-Maduro. Figures like Diosdado Cabello, the minister of the interior who controls the Chavista militias, are hated by the opposition and would almost certainly be bound for a lifetime in prison if they lost power to an opposition government. In such a situation, they may well decide that they have little more to lose from further resistance and begin an active insurgency.
The situation is particularly dangerous because of the presence of organized crime and guerrilla movements in Venezuela with links to the government. Drug cartels and Colombian narcoterrorists have operations scattered throughout the country, moving cocaine and illegally mining gold in Venezuela’s southern provinces. These forces could wreak havoc on the country if allied with defecting forces from the Venezuelan government and would be extremely difficult for the existing American military presence around Venezuela to respond to; counterinsurgency is not a task that can easily be accomplished by air strikes.
Indeed, even if the remaining Chavistas faced no difficulties whatsoever in a democratic transition, Venezuela could still face a debilitating insurgency from cartels and Colombian narcos, who have a vested interest in preventing the country from returning to the rule of law. Any new government would find itself in a thoroughly difficult position: It would need to clamp down on organized crime with police and military bodies of questionable loyalty, many of whose members have links with the very criminals they are supposed to suppress. And they would need to do so while also attempting a large-scale reorganization of government after having been out of power, and thus largely without political experience, for nearly thirty years.
Venezuela analyst Phil Gunson of the International Crisis Group told The American Conservative that the potential risk of violent insurgency from organized crime during a democratic transition could be “a huge problem.”
“In those circumstances, it doesn’t take very many people with access to weaponry to create havoc,” he said. “Even democratic governments with functioning bureaucracies and security forces find it very difficult to combat terrorist groups.”
Neighboring Colombia provides the worst-case scenario: The country’s narcoterrorists have waged a decades-long civil war against the elected government and the experienced Colombian Army. The conflict has killed hundreds of thousands of people, and at points during the ’80s and ’90s guerrilla groups controlled large swathes of the nation’s territory. Only after decades of American assistance (to the tune of billions of dollars) has Colombia managed to largely contain the narcos and maintain its territorial integrity, though it remains locked in a never-ending battle to clamp down on cocaine production.
So far, the Trump administration has wisely refrained from causing any political upheavals in Venezuela and contented itself with rebuilding Venezuela’s broken economy with the assistance of Delcy Rodriguez’s government. But the current state of affairs is still only transitional. American attention is being drawn away from the region by war in the Middle East and upcoming midterm elections. The president and secretary of state will face further political pressure to democratize the country. The Venezuelan opposition figure María Corina Machado, who finds herself largely left out in the cold by the Trump administration, may even attempt to force the United States’ hand on the issue.
So let’s wait to hang the “Mission Accomplished” banner over Caracas. This one could still turn from a headline-grabbing success into a strategic disaster.
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