When Karol Nawrocki was declared president-elect of Poland, most international observers assumed he would act as little more than a custodian of Jarosław Kaczyński’s political will—a loyal figurehead, a party emissary in presidential robes. But there are emerging signs that Nawrocki’s presidency could take a different turn, one marked not by ideological obedience but by calculated independence, diplomatic realism, and institutional maturity.
If Nawrocki plays his hand wisely, he could steer Poland away from the shrill antagonism of recent years, recalibrate its foreign policy posture, and build a presidency defined by strategic agency rather than partisan allegiance.
Nawrocki’s background—as head of the Institute of National Remembrance (IPN), an institution closely aligned with the historical politics of the Law and Justice party (PiS)—positioned him squarely within the nationalist-conservative camp. But it also means he is a product of the bureaucratic-institutional world, not of the party machine itself.
This distinction matters.
Unlike previous PiS-aligned figures, Nawrocki has not risen through the ranks as a professional politician, nor does he carry the heavy partisan debts of someone deeply embedded in the party hierarchy. In short: He may owe his presidency to PiS, but he is not made in its image. That gives him space to maneuver. Whether he chooses to use that space is another question.
Perhaps the most consequential area where Nawrocki could shift the national tone is in Poland’s stance toward Russia. Since 2022, Poland has adopted one of the most hawkish postures in Europe. Foreign policy has at times been driven more by historical trauma and ideological fervor than by strategic calculus.
Nawrocki is well-placed to restore balance.
Already, there are signs he may seek closer coordination with other Central and Eastern European leaders who advocate a realist approach to Moscow: Viktor Orbán in Hungary, Robert Fico in Slovakia, Simion in Romania, even members of Germany’s AfD. There is also a natural affinity for Donald Trump’s circle in the U.S. These actors do not deny the challenges posed by Russia—but they also prioritize diplomacy, economic pragmatism, and national interest over moral posturing.
This does not mean Nawrocki will pivot Poland toward pro-Russian policies, a move that would be political suicide. But it does suggest he may be open to moving beyond the binary of friend and foe toward a more flexible, interests-based diplomacy that puts Poland’s long-term security and economic position first.
In a volatile geopolitical landscape, that kind of realism is not weakness. It’s survival.
Another area to watch is who Nawrocki surrounds himself with in the Presidential Chancellery. If he fills the Palace with party loyalists, then the hopes of an independent presidency will quickly fade. But if he instead chooses non-partisan experts, constitutionalists, and foreign policy pragmatists, Nawrocki could transform the presidency into an intellectually credible institution, not merely a ceremonial post or party megaphone. One such figure is General Bogusław Samol, who would be the ideal candidate to lead the National Security Bureau.
This would echo moves seen in other European countries, where presidents have used their limited formal powers to exercise soft authority, elevate new voices, and influence public debate without entering direct confrontation with the government.
Given the current state of Poland’s political landscape, with tensions between the ruling coalition and conservative opposition still high, the presidency could serve as a bridge, not a weapon. But that requires Nawrocki to embrace the presidential role as a platform for unity, not polarity.
Karol Nawrocki is not yet the president of surprises—but he could become one.
If he chooses independence over obedience, diplomacy over dogma, and substance over spectacle, he could evolve into one of the most consequential and original Polish presidents since 1989. That will not please every faction within PiS. It may frustrate ideological hawks in Brussels and Washington. But it may also allow Poland to chart a sovereign, realistic, and confident course in a fractured world.
A strategically agile presidency in Warsaw could be exactly what the region needs.
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