As the war with Iran rages on, much is being said about Iranian-linked acts of terrorism in the United States. While there is indeed a possibility that the Iran war could instigate violence in the American homeland—as it appears to already have done—the severity with which the situation is being described is probably overblown. This owes to the existence of restraints that are likely to prevent “Iranian-linked terrorism” from becoming a top security challenge for America and other Western nations—which is by no means to dismiss the threat entirely.
Concerns about terrorism that can be traced back to Iran have been voiced from the higher echelons of the expert community.
Bruce Hoffman, senior fellow for counterterrorism and homeland security at the Council on Foreign Relations, warns that the risks of terrorism incidents will increase the longer the war drags on. These incidents, he explains, could take the form of lone-wolf or sleeper-cell attacks. Hoffman even goes as far as suggesting that Iran may choose to target high-profile public events like the upcoming football World Cup and the 250th Independence Day celebrations.
Similar concerns have been voiced by the Soufan Center’s Colin Clarke, who cautions that Iran may be inclined to resort to terrorism in the United States and other Western nations in order to increase public pressure on the government to end the war.
Like Hoffman, Clarke refers to lone wolf and sleeper-cell attacks, while also mentioning Iranian-directed operations involving criminal entities. He further argues that the assassination of Iran’s Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei could trigger a wave of Shiite lone wolves that could eclipse the threat posed by the Sunni lone wolves who have been influenced by the Salafi-Jihadi ideology espoused by groups like ISIS and Al Qaeda.
Both Hoffman and Clarke cite previous incidents in which Iran has been implicated, including the bombings of the Israeli embassy and Jewish community center in Argentina, the Khobar attacks in Saudi Arabia, and the bombing of the U.S. embassy in Beirut.
A more in-depth analysis, however, calls into question the severity with which the threat is depicted.
When it comes to lone-wolf operations, as I have argued before, the Khamenei assassination does indeed carry with it a very real risk of creating Shiite lone-wolves hellbent on revenge. But to argue that Shiite lone-wolves may come to pose a greater threat than ISIS and Al Qaeda–inspired Sunni individuals ignores the key element of rhetoric. Simply stated, Salafi-Jihadi groups openly encourage random violence, whereas “radical Shiites” represented by Iran and its allies do not.
This point is clearly illustrated through rhetorical comparison. Following the assassination of the former IRGC commander Qassem Soleimani in an American drone strike in early 2020, the former Hezbollah leader Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah—while calling for retaliatory attacks against US troops in the Middle East—emphasized that American civilians were not legitimate targets. ISIS by contrast called for random attacks in Europe to exact revenge for the killing of its former leader, Abu Ibrahim Al-Qureishi. Likewise, shortly after the start of the Israeli war on Gaza, Nasrallah voiced support for operations against American troops in Iraq and Syria, whereas ISIS and Al-Qaeda called for both lone-wolf and September 11–style attacks in Western nations.
This helps explain why lone-wolf “Islamist” attacks in the West have nearly always been perpetrated by Sunnis and never Shiites. Inspiration relies heavily on encouragement which can easily be found in Salafi-Jihadi rhetoric.
This is not to say that the latest developments concerning Iran will not give birth to a Shiite lone-wolf phenomenon, but rather that it would be premature to judge that this phenomenon may soon constitute a greater threat than Salafi-Jihadi–inspired terrorism. This is especially the case given that the assassination of Khamenei and the wider war on Iran has not led—thus far—to a shift in rhetoric in which the “radical Shiite axis” is following the Salafi-Jihadi playbook by advocating for revenge attacks in the United States and the West more broadly.
For example, Hezbollah—which is Iran’s number one ally—has resumed cross-border operations against Israel. Iraqi Shiite groups allied with Iran meanwhile have attacked American bases in Iraq. But none of these players has openly called for terrorist attacks in the West, and more importantly did not do so even during the leadership vacuum in Iran.
Just as this rhetorical factor has prevented Shiite lone wolf-terrorism in the past, it is likely to continue to have a restraining effect at the very least.
Meanwhile, to argue that Iran may orchestrate—and not simply inspire—terrorist attacks in the United States and other Western nations via third parties or sleeper cells also overlooks some key factors.
Statements out of Iran indicate that Tehran is looking to capitalize on a new phenomenon represented by the growing and unprecedented anti-Israeli sentiments in the United States, with prominent voices from the American conservative camp accusing Trump of adopting an Israel-first approach.
Iran’s Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi, for example, accused Trump of sacrificing American interests for the sake of Israel in deciding to go to war against Iran in a post on X: “Trump has turned ‘America First’ into ‘Israel First’—which always means ‘America Last’.”
Secretary of Iran’s National Security Council Ali Larijani echoed Araghchi’s rhetoric, writing “TRUMP HAS BETRAYED ‘AMERICA FIRST’ TO ADOPT ‘ISRAEL FIRST.’”
What is also interesting about these statements is how they differ sharply from the “Great Satan” label Iran has historically applied to the United States even in non-war times. By focusing on Israel’s role in taking the U.S. to war and apparently softening its anti-American rhetoric, Tehran appears to be embarking on a strategy of “counter-lobbying” Israel, in which it is making common cause with a sizeable segment of American voices who now see their country’s national interest subordinated to Israel’s.
Against this backdrop, to argue that Iran may orchestrate terrorist attacks in the American homeland stands in direct contradiction with its current counter-lobbying strategy and plays into the hands of Israeli lobbying efforts.
Iran and its allies also possess far greater capabilities today than they did in previous decades when they were implicated in acts of terrorism. Tehran’s missile and drone arsenal has enabled it to conduct fierce attacks in the Gulf region, and its military appears to have succeeded in effectively taking control of the Strait of Hormuz, leading to a sharp spike in energy prices. Hezbollah meanwhile recently launched over 200 rockets in a single salvo, demonstrating that it possesses a formidable arsenal despite the heavy pounding it took in its 57-day war with Israel in late 2024.
This is to say that Iran and its allies are nowhere near degraded to the extent that they will soon be forced to resort to terrorist operations in the United States. Rather, the current war has revealed that Iran and its Shiite axis are capable of causing real damage without taking the risk of committing terrorism. The Tehran-led Shiite axis is also likely aware that mass casualty attacks have led the American public to rally behind their leaders in wars of retaliation, as the cases of Pearl Harbor and 9/11 clearly demonstrate.
The rising negative views of Israel in the U.S., along with the military capabilities possessed by Iran and its allies, act as restraints preventing Iran from adopting the riskier approach of orchestrating terrorism against the American homeland.
The assassination of Khamenei and the war on Iran are no doubt game-changers. But while the American homeland is not immune to the emergence of Shiite lone-wolf attacks, the major risks to American interests are likely to remain largely confined to the theater of the Middle East.
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