As Washington weighs its military and diplomatic options in Iran, there is one fundamental question that has seemingly been overlooked: What if Iran is already an undeclared nuclear state?
In addition to Iran’s formidable conventional capabilities, we know that in 2023 the IAEA detected uranium particles enriched at 83.7 percent, dangerously close to the optimal 90 percent weapons-grade threshold. We know that Iran has accumulated more than 400 kilograms of highly enriched uranium that appears to have largely survived American and Israeli strikes and may have even been moved in part or in whole to undisclosed locations. Contrary to statements that the 12-Day War “obliterated Iran’s ability to create nuclear weapons,” the current American build-up in the region suggests the opposite.
According to a recent analysis in the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Iran’s declared 60 percent enriched uranium stockpile would be sufficient to produce at least one, if not several, crude nuclear weapons. Importantly, no further enrichment would be required. Such weapons would not depend on sophisticated missile delivery systems; a truck, helicopter, ship, or other improvised platform would suffice. Detonation could occur on top of a mountain, near American bases—even in the Strait of Hormuz, through which one-fifth of the world’s oil and natural gas flows. Or, the Iranians could simply dust off the Anglo-American “denial plan” formulated during the Cold War, which contemplated taking Middle East oil fields offline via a conventional or nuclear strike, an act that would almost certainly vaporize trillions of dollars in global market value.
Whether Iran has already assembled a nuclear bomb or not remains an open question, but there is good reason to err on the side of caution. Even if it has not yet assembled a bomb, Iran, with a territory almost seven times as large as the UK and a population of 93 million, likely possesses the capability to do so rapidly, secretly, and under conditions of a perceived existential threat. If Iran’s leaders fear that they could end up, in the best of circumstances, like Bashar al-Assad or Hosni Mubarak, or in the worst of circumstances, like Saddam Hussein or Muamar Gaddafi, then it seems reasonable to assume that they would do anything and everything to save themselves.
During the Cold War, Americans were taught that global peace rested on the threat of “mutually assured destruction.” There was truth in that doctrine; nuclear weapons did deter deliberate all-out world war to a certain extent. But the historical evidence reveals a less reassuring picture. The world came perilously close to global nuclear war not once, but repeatedly: during the Berlin Crisis of 1961, the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962, the Six-Day War of 1967, and the Yom Kippur War of 1973. Nuclear war was averted not because deterrence worked exactly as theorized, but because of individual restraint and sheer luck.
Luck is now in shorter supply, and so is restraint.
The guardrails that once inhibited reckless nuclear behavior are weakening. The logic of mutually assured destruction has been quietly eroded as nuclear-armed rivals test the idea that limited war can be fought safely below the nuclear threshold. The recent conflicts between India and Pakistan did not escalate to nuclear war, ironically teaching precisely the wrong lesson.
The nuclearization of the Middle East has magnified these dangers further. In addition to Israel’s undeclared but formidable nuclear arsenal and Iran’s highly enriched uranium stockpile, Saudi Arabia, the financier of Pakistan’s nuclear program, has signed a mutual defense pact with Islamabad and, effectively, has access to a bomb “on the shelf.” Turkey may soon join this pact, forming a “Sunni NATO” to balance against Shiite Iran and Israel.
Conceivably, Washington could now be considering several options: 1) do nothing and allow Iran to retain and expand its nuclear capability; 2) launch a choreographed strike that permits Iran to respond with a limited counterstrike; 3) attempt all-out regime change or targeted assassination; 4) impose a naval blockade; 5) issue a nuclear ultimatum. For different reasons, any of these options could escalate into a serious global crisis, making Iran more likely to act in desperation and for its partners to double down on their support.
There is a far superior sixth option. The United States must create a grand strategy to revive diplomacy and arms control aimed at halting proliferation and restoring meaningful international safeguards on Iran’s nuclear program. Washington and its Western allies are not alone. The incipient Sunni NATO, China, Russia, and India—four major nuclear powers—do not want nuclear proliferation in their backyard.
Crucially, they too have reasons to mistrust Iran. We must remember that Pakistan and Iran attacked one another in 2024; Riyadh has a historic rivalry with Tehran; and the Russians, despite their current strategic partnership, were not so long ago viewed by the ayatollahs as the “lesser Satan.” Threatened with sanctions, India now appears to be forsaking Iranian oil in favor of American energy. And China, which buys 80 to 90 percent of Iran’s oil, recently sided with the UAE in its dispute with Iran over strategically located islands. The collective opposition of these powers to an Iranian bomb could be the United States’ greatest diplomatic leverage.
It should be used before luck runs out.
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