On January 24, 2026, Generals Zhang Youxia and Liu Zhenli, two high-ranking Chinese military officials, were placed under investigation. While not quite technically purged, they are heading that way. Their fall raises questions about the future of the high command of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), the Taiwan issue, and U.S.–China relations. Time will tell what happens to the PLA. Taiwan is a core interest for China, so the purges are only one part of the calculus, not the main variable. For U.S.–China relations, stability will be more determined by the two presidents, not just who interfaces at the military-to-military level.
Zhang and Liu were members of the Central Military Commission (CMC), the PLA’s supreme command organ. At the last Chinese Communist Party (CCP) congress in October 2022, the CMC had Xi Jinping and six other members. Over three years later, and with under two years left until the next Party Congress, the CMC currently consists of just Xi Jinping and Zhang Shengmin.
Since 2012, Xi has waged a kind of “forever war” against military corruption, but largely focused on retired PLA figures. But when 15 leaders from the PLA Rocket Force (PLARF) and the defense industry were punished, it hinted that the investigators were marching upward toward the current CMC.
In June 2024, Defense Minister Li Shangfu and his predecessor Wei Fenghe (fully retired in March 2023) were expelled for bribery. They were joined by CMC Vice Chairman General He Weidong and Admiral Miao Hua, who were purged in October 2025. This duo had overseen political ideology and personnel management at the CMC level. An October 2025 press release from Xinhua stated that “their violations involved exceptionally large amounts of money, and are of extremely serious nature and with extremely negative impacts.” That left three military officers in the CMC. The dust had barely settled on He and Miao when the official news broke about Zhang Youxia and Liu Zhenli.
Zhang Youxia was a combat veteran and a company commander during the Sino-Vietnam conflict (1979–1991). He rose steadily through the ranks of the PLA Ground Forces (PLAGF) before joining the CMC and overseeing weapons procurement. Xi would then elevate Zhang to a vice chairmanship and to the Politburo in 2017. But what later stood out was when Xi “broke” a soft rule on age-delineated retirement norms (appointees must be 67 or younger at the beginning of a five-year term). In October 2022, Zhang was 72 years old, well past the limit. But he was retained. It has been noted that Xi and Zhang have a long family history, but public details are few. Better to focus on what is known: Xi decided to exempt Zhang from retirement norms. That speaks volumes about his capability and respect among current and retired PLA leaders. Though it could equally reflect a desire to watch closely over what Zhang was doing.
Much less is known about Liu Zhenli. Liu also saw combat against Vietnam. His later years as commander of the PLA Ground Forces coincided with major organizational reforms that Xi began. Liu’s 2022 appointment to direct the Joint Staff Department (JSD) is noteworthy because the JSD role oversees joint operations and interfaces with the PLA’s five theater commands (similar to U.S. Combatant Commands).
Zhang and Liu had not made public appearances since December 22, 2025, when they had attended a promotion ceremony for new four-star generals. But it was their subsequent absence from a January 19 political study session that telegraphed trouble. They could not be spotted in any photographs next to their military peers. By the weekend, it was announced that they were “under investigation.”
In a November 12, 2025 essay for People’s Daily, Zhang wrote about how the PLA would need to implement the latest tasks coming out of the 20th Party Congress. He highlighted that political reliability, loyalty, and anti-corruption are the highest priorities. Zhang wrote that the CCP’s system provided the PLA with advantages to construct a superior army. He concedes that the military procurement needs to improve and nods to the role that Party leadership should play.
The most fascinating phrase is the mention of “two-faced people” who seem politically aligned, yet “violate Party principles.” He probably did not expect that in the court of opinion, he would soon be judged as one of those “two-faced people.”
Ample details are unlikely to be forthcoming. PLA investigations tend to reveal even less than other CCP cases. The silence allows rumors to proliferate, especially the variety about coups being averted. While the official explanation may not satiate curiosity, it’s worth assessing what is available. A January 25 essay in the PLA Daily framed Zhang and Liu’s descent as necessary because they “seriously fueled political and corruption issues.” Removing them acts as a cleanse that “eliminates toxins” and “removes rot to promote healing.”
Zhang and Liu “seriously betrayed the trust and heavy responsibility” from their offices, and “trampled and undermined the CMC Chairman Responsibility System.” Zhang and Liu were probably assessed as lacking sufficient political character. Perhaps it’s a simple story about financial corruption finally catching up to them, but it’s likely to go deeper and involve actions or inactions that undermined Xi’s confidence and touched military effectiveness: “They have caused immense damage to the military’s political construction, political ecology, and combat capability construction, and have had an extremely vile influence on the Party, the state, and the military.” The concluding section assuages doubt about the anti-corruption efforts, stating that more efforts will make the PLA “stronger, purer, and more combat-capable.” That leaves one military officer on the CMC, Zhang Shengmin.
Zhang leads the PLA’s anticorruption efforts. Before January 2017, his career had been spent as a PLARF political commissar. One of his last PLARF roles was serving alongside Wei Fenghe (whom he later helped purge) as political commissar. But nine months before the 19th Party Congress, Zhang assumed leadership of the CMC Discipline and Inspection Commission. When the Party convened, he remained in his role but was additionally granted a seat on the CMC itself. This was highly unusual, but it suggested that Xi was just getting started on military anti-corruption efforts.
Since 2010, Xi has served with 22 military officers on the CMC. Ten of them have fallen during the anticorruption campaign, and Zhang has overseen eight of those cases. In October 2025, he stepped into the empty vice chairman seat vacated by He. Zhang is projected to retire at the 21st Party Congress, though it is worth watching to see what happens to him: Does he continue his work, does he retire, or does he too fall prey to the purges, perhaps after outlasting his usefulness? The editorial that framed Zhang Youxia and Liu’s purge leaves the door open, saying “the digging is going deeper.”
There are questions about what comes next. The CMC is now down to Xi and Zhang Shengmin. Will more leaders join the CMC before October 2027? If so, who are they, and from where in the PLA system will they rise? The most obvious role to fill is the second vice chairman position. It would be logical to keep power divided, lest Zhang be “tempted.” Many of the purges came from the PLAGF and PLARF, so the PLA Navy or PLA Air Force might emerge stronger.
The theater commanders have not traditionally been CMC members, while the PLA reorganization left service chiefs and many CMC department leaders on the outside. Xi’s decision will reveal who he views as loyal and capable and what roles and experiences are valuable. There is also the possibility of bringing on civilians. But this move would beget speculation, as party officials and analysts alike wonder if these individuals are auditioning to succeed Xi.
Relatedly, there are natural questions about the PLA and Taiwan. Losing key military leaders will undoubtedly affect the PLA. Unexpected departures mean a loss of experience and institutional knowledge. Zhang and Liu had combat experience and knew well the sober realities of warfighting; however, these conflicts were over forty years ago, and primarily featured infantry and artillery combined arms, far different from the joint warfighting a Taiwan scenario is likely to involve. Officially, the PLA has articulated that fighting corruption and removing it not only cleans up the organization but also improves warfighting and unit cohesion. There is some sense to this, but it is not the most important factor to consider.
What’s most important is that China still views Taiwan as a core interest, particularly desiring to unify with the island, to end the Chinese Civil War, and to finally put the Century of Humiliation behind it. Xi Jinping and the rest of the CCP are unlikely to alter their views concerning Taiwan. Purges in military leadership are unlikely to change this fact, though they may affect other decisions around strategy.
The PLA still possesses military superiority over Taiwan. And if the decision is made to go kinetic, one should not rule out China’s willingness to pay a steep price and fight a protracted war. It’s important to emphasize that this is not China’s preferred policy, and that “peaceful unification” is the first-ranked choice. But hard power will not be taken off the table. The anticorruption efforts in the PLA may spell trouble for more military leaders, but it does not change the basic calculus about Taiwan.
For the United States, what does this mean? Zhang Youxia had built a connection with then U.S. National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan. According to Sullivan, their August 2024 meeting in Beijing was the first time in eight years that a U.S. official had sat down with a CMC vice chairman. They had discussed military-to-military communications, Taiwan, and the South China Sea. While Sullivan and Zhang are both gone, the Trump administration has kept channels open: Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth met face-to-face with Defense Minister Admiral Dong Jun in October 2025.
What will matter most for the United States is for President Donald Trump to continue thawing relations with China. The likely April 2026 visit to Beijing is important and a chance to continue building stability and de-escalating military tensions. Trump and Xi will not return to early 2000s-style “engagement.” The challenge that their respective countries pose to one another makes it unlikely and unrealistic.
And while they figure out what shape the economic competition will take, they can continue to build trust in the military domain and reassure one another that war is not desirable or productive among them. Trump has wisely not commented on the development. It’s best to let China deal with this problem itself and to focus on the tenor of preparing for the visit to China.
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