As the U.S. and Iran struggle to find common ground on which to build an agreement during the ceasefire, the Gulf Cooperation Council met in Saudi Arabia last week for the first time since the war began. They focused on Iranian attacks on their member states. They condemned both the attacks and the closure of the Strait of Hormuz and called on Iran to rebuild trust. The leaders discussed the need to enhance military coordination but also on the need to coordinate “in pursuit of a diplomatic path forward to preserve the security and stability of the region.”
These nations—Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates—want a regional solution that takes their needs into consideration. They want to be included in whatever agreement finally emerges. Their insistence on inclusion is understandable. They feel abandoned and betrayed by everyone. They are mad at the U.S. for provoking their being bombed; they are mad at Iran for bombing them.
The Gulf states have tried very hard to stay out of the war on Iran. But they are home to one of the largest American forward military deployments in the world, a network of 13 U.S. bases and 40,000 U.S. troops that has made the war possible.
Kuwait hosts more U.S. bases than any other country in the region. Bahrain is home to the U.S. Navy’s Fifth Fleet. Qatar hosts Al Udeid Air Base, the largest U.S. military facility in the region and a headquarters for U.S. Central Command. In the UAE is Al Dhafra Air Base, from which Washington coordinates intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance. Saudi Arabia is home to the Prince Sultan Air Base.
Yet, these same Gulf states warned the U.S. against the war, exerted tremendous effort to lobby against it, condemned it once it began, and have worked hard to stay out of it, though the U.S. has pushed hard for them to join the war and attack Iran. They have assured Iran that they will not allow the U.S. to use their territory or airspace, but that wasn’t a promise they were able to keep.
Though the Gulf states are doing none of the bombing, they have been the recipient of 83 percent of Iranian drone and missile attacks. Analysts have pointed out that the Gulf states are being struck unevenly. Hassan Ahmadian, associate professor of Middle East and North Africa studies at the University of Tehran, says that Iran sees the UAE and Bahrain as the worst offenders and that they have been struck the most. Kuwait and Saudi Arabia have also been hit hard. Qatar and Oman have been struck less often, and there is speculation that they may have made secret deals with Iran to reduce the frequency of attacks.
Annelle Sheline, research fellow in the Middle East program at the Quincy Institute, told The American Conservative that “the Gulf States are furious with the U.S. for ignoring their warnings that attacking Iran would prove disastrous.” They have borne the brunt of a war they did not want and that has set back security and recent, hard-won improvements in relationships in the region, not to mention damage to their economy, tourism, image, and infrastructure.
The American forward military presence in the Gulf region is intended to assure a steady flow of energy from the Persian Gulf. It has spectacularly failed to do that. It is meant to project power against Iran and to defend the Gulf countries from attacks from Iran. It has also failed to do that. Instead of protecting the Gulf states, the American bases they host have made them targets. Once busting with confidence in the American security umbrella that protected them, Sheline says that now the Gulf states “must grapple with the reality that the presence of U.S. military bases and other assets are proving a much greater liability than a source of security.” The Gulf states really did not want this war, and they are outraged with the U.S. for bringing it to them.
Iran did not make the decision to bring it to them lightly. Recent Iranian foreign policy has focused on repairing relations with Saudi Arabia and Bahrain, as well as Egypt and Turkey. Iran’s Foreign Minister, Abbas Araghchi, called on Iran’s “brotherly neighbors to expel foreign aggressors.” Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian apologized for striking Iran’s neighbors and said that Iran would cease targeting neighboring countries “unless an attack originated from there.”
But, having lost the protection of international law, the United Nations, and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, and having been attacked twice during diplomacy, Iran sees itself in an existential situation requiring extraordinary military measures. Maria Luisa Fantappiè, Head of the Mediterranean, Middle East and Africa program at the Istituto Affari Internazionali, explained that, faced with this existential crisis, Iran is not able to prioritize relations with the Gulf states.
Iran sees strikes on the Gulf states and restrictions on the Strait of Hormuz as the most efficient and effective way of making the U.S. feel the pain of its war on Iran. And from Iran’s perspective, Ahmadian notes, the war on Iran would not have been possible without the U.S. infrastructure in the Gulf states. Relations are being stretched as far as possible without yet being torn, and there is little trust left, according to both Ahmadian and Fantappiè.
The Gulf states are being as patient as possible and, so far, despite the missiles and drones, haven’t actively joined the war. Fantappiè says that Saudi Arabia does not want to join the war and that, even if it were forced to, Riyadh would not wage war in concert with the U.S. but would fight on its own. Bader Al-Saif, assistant professor at Kuwait University, agrees, observing that the Gulf states do not want to be seen as part of a U.S.–Israeli front against Iran.
Reports emerged that the Saudi government was pushing the U.S. to continue the war and to put an end to the Iranian threat. This, though, may just be a U.S. psychological operation to exacerbate the gulf between Saudi Arabia and Iran. Saudi officials denied the report, and both Al-Saif and Fantappiè say there is no evidence of Saudi lobbying and that the reports are not true.
The Gulf states are very angry with Iran. But Iran is also very angry with the Gulf states. Iran is aware that the U.S. is using its Gulf bases in various ways, including for radars that are a crucial part of its air defence system. Iran has targeted those radars and has rendered many of the 13 bases in the region “uninhabitable.”
On April 13, Iran sent a letter to the UN demanding compensation from five states they say have allowed use of their territory or, in some cases, have even directly participated in attacks. The Islamic Republic named Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Bahrain, UAE, and Jordan, but not Kuwait.
In Jordan, the number of U.S. fighter jets at Jordan’s Muwaffaq Salti base tripled to 60 in the days before the bombing of Iran began.
Jennifer Kavanagh, a military analyst at Defense Priorities, told TAC that “official U.S. Army accounts provide clear evidence that the U.S. has launched PRSM missiles from HIMARS in either Kuwait or Bahrain.” Video verified by FRANCE 24 shows multiple missiles being fired by HIMARS systems from Kuwait on two occasions in March. An explosion in Bahrain that injured 32 people was originally blamed on Iran but has now been shown to have resulted from interceptors fired from a U.S.-operated Patriot air defense battery in the country.
Kavanagh says there are “thousands of troops at U.S. bases across the region… providing logistics, intelligence, and other support to U.S. forces.” Ballistic missiles and drones that struck a U.S. air base in Saudi Arabia revealed a strong U.S. presence there: At least 15 U.S. troops were injured, multiple refueling aircraft were damaged, and an E-3 AWACS Sentry aircraft was obliterated.
Then there is the incident in which three U.S. fighter jets were shot down, reportedly by friendly fire, in Kuwaiti airspace. Al-Saif told TAC that Kuwait was sincere in its insistence that its airspace would not be used without permission or for “any offensive action against Iran.” He says that “the three U.S. jets crossed Kuwaiti airspace without the knowledge or permission of Kuwait and hence Kuwait downed them as it violated the country’s airspace.”
The UAE appears to be the hawkish outlier. It may be urging the Gulf states to join the U.S. and has said it would be willing to join a U.S.-led international effort to “secure navigation in the Strait of Hormuz.” In an extraordinary first, Israel sent an Iron Dome air defense battery and interceptors and dozens of IDF operators to the UAE. The system has been used only to intercept Iranian missiles fired at the UAE. And at the moment the GCC summit began, the Emirati government announced it was leaving the Saudi-led OPEC group of oil-producing countries.
One of the setbacks from this war will be the harm done to the security and reintegration that was developing in the Gulf region. The trust between Iran and its neighbours has been severely set back. But the Gulf states’ relationship with the U.S. has been hurt just as badly. The U.S. dragged the Gulf states into a war over their objections and then failed to provide the protection promised.
The Gulf states’ defense is far too integrated into the U.S. network for complete extrication from the American security order to be practical. But the Gulf states will likely look to diversify their security partnerships. Their relationship with Iran has been set back, but the progress they had made toward reintegration is not irreparably lost. “With much confidence building,” Al-Saif said, Iran and the Gulf states “can still go back to integration.”
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