Time to face an uncomfortable truth: America lost the Iran War. It’s a development not only discomfiting but world-historical, marking the pitiful conclusion of American primacy and the “U.S.-led international order.”
President Donald Trump is in a bind. Escalating the war in hopes of changing the outcome would worsen its deleterious effects and almost certainly fail to force Iranian capitulation. But reaching a peace agreement is difficult, thanks to a near-total absence of Iranian trust in any commitments that Trump might make.
The solution to Trump’s predicament, I’ve come to believe, can be found in an unlikely source: a little-discussed work of political psychology published more than a half century ago. More on that anon but, in short, Trump should initiate a “peace race” with the Islamic Republic: unilaterally make a bold concession, invite Tehran to reciprocate, and continue the cycle until the U.S. and Iran have transformed mutual antipathy into constructive relations.
But before I get to the “call to action” portions of this column, let’s take stock of the stunning defeat America has suffered.
Iran won’t soon relinquish its newfound control over the Strait of Hormuz, so the U.S. must relinquish its role as global guarantor of trade routes. American retrenchment from Iran’s vicinity seems inevitable, both because Tehran demands it and because our bases in the region are wrecked and would cost a fortune to rebuild. After unprovoked U.S.-Israeli attacks, Iran has greater incentive and willingness to acquire a nuclear deterrent. Moreover, the war has accelerated America’s decline relative to China, its chief rival and only peer competitor.
How did this happen?
We threw just about everything we had at Iran—including most of our offensive long-range missiles and defensive interceptor missiles—yet we didn’t accomplish our goals. Trump was able to secure a ceasefire in June, but it quickly fell apart after the U.S. arguably violated it by creating a Hormuz route outside Iranian control. Over the last few weeks, Tehran has set the tempo and geographical scope of hostilities and eschewed a pause in fighting initiated by Trump. The Iranians seem intent on denying the U.S. any breathing room to rearm, calm markets, and relaunch the war under more favorable conditions.
Clearly, the White House badly underestimated Tehran’s resilience and resolve—an inexcusable miscalculation considering the frantic warnings issued by Iran experts before the war. There aren’t many silver linings here amid the gloom and doom. (One strong candidate is American retrenchment from the Middle East, a region of long-diminished strategic value and a sandtrap upon which U.S. foreign policy recurrently founders.)
Theoretically, Trump could launch a land invasion or destroy civilian infrastructure, but he’s constrained by public opinion, energy prices, munitions stockpiles, and Iran’s retaliatory capabilities, which remain mostly intact even after the U.S. strategic bombing campaign. Trump has indicated he’ll maintain economic pressure, hoping for Iran to throw in the towel. But the Iranians have demonstrated a high pain tolerance and believe they’re fighting an existential war. With oil prices rising, his poll numbers declining, and the midterms drawing near, Trump may find that his own pain tolerance is a great deal lower.
Given these constraints, America’s top general Dan Caine is reportedly urging Trump officials to find an off-ramp. But an easy off-ramp is precisely what Iran’s ascendant hardliners aim to deny the American president. A statement released on Sunday by the secretary of Iran’s national security council demanded the U.S. make significant military and economic concessions before the Hormuz is reopened. On Monday, an advisor to Iran’s lead negotiator ruled out the possibility of any agreement with Trump.
In short, Trump can neither restart the war nor secure a deal. And he probably can’t let the problem fester for long, because of the pain tolerance issue, nor simply walk away, since Iran requires concessions to open Hormuz. It’s an astonishing predicament. Still, he’s gotten out of seemingly hopeless traps before, and he can do so again. That brings me back to the “little-discussed work of political psychology” I mentioned earlier.
Charles Osgood wrote An Alternative to War or Surrender as a how-to guide on easing tensions with the Soviet Union and averting nuclear holocaust. The book, published in 1962, was clearly aimed at President John F. Kennedy, and the context was the most perilous phase of the Cold War. In our own perilous context, it may hold the key Trump needs to break the Iran logjam and save his presidency.
In the book, Osgood developed a policy he termed Graduated Reciprocation in Tension-reduction or GRIT. (The initials, he observed, suggest the kind of determined tough-mindedness needed to carry the policy out. GRIT is an alternative to war and surrender, after all.) The “essential idea of Grit,” Osgood wrote, was simple: “that the tensions/arms race spiral may offer the model for its own reversal.” The aim was to replace bilateral tensions with mutual trust. So, how can Trump get the GRIT ball rolling?
Rather than signing a paper agreement containing a set of commitments that neither the Americans nor the Iranians trust the other side to uphold, Trump should simply announce that he is making some dramatic concession and urge Tehran to respond with a concession of its own. Osgood stressed that no concession should cripple America’s capacity to thwart aggression (which seems less of a problem here than in the Cold War, when the U.S. faced a nuclear-armed peer competitor). At the same time, concessions should be sufficiently meaningful to signal an earnest desire for peace.
Osgood also recommended that unilateral initiatives “be announced publicly at some reasonable interval period prior to their execution and identified as part of a deliberate policy of reducing and controlling tensions.” The interval gives time for the other nation to consider its response and for its doves—as well as third-party mediators—to build pressure on its government to reciprocate. It also heightens the psychological impact of seeing the American president follow through on a promised gesture of goodwill.
At first, the other side will suspect some kind of trickery, but since GRIT involves deeds rather than mere words, it should lead to a recognition of the genuine opportunity on offer. Osgood held that an American president should be willing to make a second unilateral concession even if the first one went unreciprocated. If and when the other side reciprocates, the Americans can then select another unilateral concession from a predetermined “supply of potential actions, graduated in the degree of risk entailed and diversified over various spheres and loci of application.” And the cycle, hopefully, continues.
There’s no big mystery about what sort of meaningful concessions Trump can make. As the New York Times reports, the aforementioned statement released by Iran’s national security council “called for the United States to lift its naval blockade and sanctions on Iran, withdraw the U.S. military from around Iran, pay war reparations and release frozen Iranian assets, as well as end attacks on Iran’s allies in the region and threats against the country.”
Now, Iran hawks might object that I’m essentially urging Trump to give in to outrageous Iranian demands. Capitulation! Treason! The Islamic Republic killed 2,000—no, make that two million protesters this year alone!
A few points in my defense: 1) Trump already agreed to do all of the above, more or less, in the memorandum of understanding he signed in June; 2) under GRIT, he would do these one at a time, rather than all at once, and in between Iran would make concessions of its own; 3) the Iran hawks got us into this catastrophe and should retire from geopolitical commentary.
GRIT seems well-suited to Trump’s psychology. Rather than slinking away in apparent defeat, he would seize the initiative. He’d need to deliver big, attention-grabbing Oval Office addresses to announce new concessions and acknowledge the most recent concession made by Iran. A man of action, Trump tires of tedious, drawn-out diplomatic procedures and might not even read the agreements he signs. Under GRIT, he and Iran would visibly enact the peace process rather than have their negotiators quibble over legalistic language.
It’s worth a shot.
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