Pakistan has long practiced a careful balancing act to manage relations with Iran and the Gulf Arab monarchies. But against the backdrop of the ongoing U.S.-Israeli war on Iran, and the emergence of Yemen and the Red Sea as the “Western Front” of this regional crisis, the balancing act is getting harder to sustain.
Pakistan has strong strategic and economic ties with Saudi Arabia and other Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) members, and has long seen stability in the Gulf as important to its interests. So Islamabad naturally has no appetite for Iranian or Houthi attacks on targets in GCC states, and officials in Islamabad have been quick to condemn such aggression. At the same time, Pakistan has much at stake in its relationship with Iran, with which it also seeks stable and cordial ties.
Geography dictates that Pakistan accept fundamental differences between its relationship with Iran and those with Gulf Arab states. The Pakistan–Iran border is long and difficult, and cross-border militant activity, particularly in Balochistan, is a persistent concern for both countries. Iran’s engagement with Afghanistan also affects Pakistani security interests in its near abroad. Nor is the relationship limited strictly to security. Pakistan has sought to expand bilateral trade and remains interested in energy cooperation, including the long-discussed Iran–Pakistan gas pipeline. Iran’s position on the Gulf of Oman also touches Pakistan’s maritime and economic interests, to say nothing of Tehran’s relationship with New Delhi.
Therefore, Pakistan’s regional balancing act requires recognizing that while Saudi Arabia is a crucial strategic, defense, and economic partner, Iran is Pakistan’s immediate neighbor. A serious deterioration in relations with Tehran could generate direct consequences for Pakistan’s border security, regional stability, and economic interests, underscoring why Islamabad has such strong incentives to preserve a functional relationship with Iran, independent of its desire to maintain its partnerships with Saudi Arabia and other GCC members.
Domestic politics matter too. Pakistan has a sizable Shia minority, which includes elements sympathetic to Iran, so there is a chance taking a harder line toward Tehran could trigger protests at home.
Pakistan wants to see the current U.S.-Iran crisis resolved as quickly as possible, which is why its government has invested considerable diplomatic energy in trying to de-escalate the conflict, seeking to position itself as a bridge between the two sides. Preserving that intermediary role requires Pakistan to avoid becoming an active belligerent.
Unveiled last month, the new Mecca Joint Defense Agreement—a security configuration consisting of Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey—and Pakistan’s recently ratified defense pact with Kuwait stand to significantly complicate this delicate balancing act.
The latest Houthi attacks on Saudi Arabia are an early test of what these new security commitments actually mean. The Mecca pact does not appear to create an automatic obligation to fight if a member is attacked; rather it provides a framework for consultation and collective action. The affected country requests assistance under the agreement, and the members themselves determine what form that assistance should take. Nevertheless, such an arrangement can strengthen deterrence without guaranteeing immediate military response.
The alliance itself is still a work in progress. The military and policymaking integration necessary to implement such an agreement takes time. And, notably, Saudi Arabia has not actually requested direct Pakistani or Turkish military intervention. For now, Islamabad is more likely to contribute through diplomacy, intelligence, air-defense capabilities, and technological assistance, and perhaps supporting a multinational naval presence around the Bab al-Mandeb. (It’s worth noting that this past May, Pakistan reportedly deployed a detachment including 8,000 troops and 16 military aircraft to Saudi Arabia.)
There are good reasons for this restraint. Pakistan has previously resisted becoming a combatant in Yemen, highlighted by a parliamentary vote on April 10, 2015, to reject a proposal to join the Saudi-led military coalition fighting the Houthis. At that time, Pakistani parliamentarians vowed “unequivocal support for the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia” while also declaring that Islamabad “should maintain neutrality in the Yemen conflict so as to be able to play a proactive diplomatic role to end the crisis.”
Today, sending troops into the conflict would still carry serious domestic, economic, security, and diplomatic costs for Pakistan. More importantly, joining the war on the Saudi side could undermine Islamabad’s channels with Tehran and its effort to facilitate U.S.–Iran de-escalation.
Here is a dilemma. An alliance’s credibility ultimately rests on its members’ willingness to commit to collective defense in the face of real costs. If Pakistan consistently avoids direct military involvement, members and non-members alike may come to wonder how far the pact’s security guarantees actually extend.
Nevertheless, restraint should not automatically be interpreted as failure, especially at this early stage. Pakistan can contribute meaningfully, whether by diplomacy or through the provision of ancillary military support, in ways that don’t require the involvement of combat forces. The challenge for Pakistan is to use those contributions to demonstrate that its defense commitments are credible, without widening a regional war or endangering its role as a mediator.
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