With recent military clashes in the Gulf, combined with continued Israeli aggression against Lebanon and Gaza, the U.S.–Iran ceasefire is increasingly vulnerable to violence in the region. Regardless of the ceasefire’s fate, the U.S.-Israel war on Iran has created a new reality in the Gulf, rendering the pre-February 28 status quo largely obsolete. Yet despite their shared concerns over regional stability, the six Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states are unlikely to converge around a common approach to Tehran. Instead, the conflict has highlighted underlying divisions within the GCC, reflecting differing assessments of regional security.
As Oman, Qatar, and Saudi Arabia commit to diplomatic engagement with Tehran and the pursuit of a non-aggression arrangement, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) has distinguished itself as the GCC’s most hawkishly anti-Iranian member, bringing Abu Dhabi into greater alignment with the American-Israeli alliance than any other Arab capital.
The Wall Street Journal recently reported that the UAE conducted dozens of air strikes against Iranian targets from the early days of the war until the Pakistani-mediated ceasefire went into effect on April 8. The Emiratis coordinated their military operations in concert with Washington and Tel Aviv, hitting islands in the Strait of Hormuz, energy facilities, and petrochemical infrastructure.
Recent remarks by Emirati officials indicate that Abu Dhabi may be increasingly inclined toward deescalation. On May 22, Anwar Gargash, senior diplomatic adviser to the UAE’s President Mohamed bin Zayed (MBZ), warned that a return to hostilities would be “catastrophic” for the region. Earlier last month, he also argued that Arab states’ relations with Iran should not be based on confrontation. Reinforcing this message, MBZ and the Emir of Qatar spoke by telephone on May 23 and underscored the importance of supporting diplomatic pathways in the interest of regional security and stability.
Nevertheless, despite such rhetoric, it would be premature to conclude that there is a transformation in the UAE’s Iran policy. Abu Dhabi is instead probably engaging in pragmatic risk management, seeking to preserve strategic flexibility amid heightened regional uncertainty while easing pressure from Tehran through carefully calibrated messaging. The UAE’s increasingly conciliatory language, therefore, is reflective of a tactical effort to manage perceptions and safeguard its interests in an increasingly volatile environment.
The UAE’s adoption of a more conciliatory tone toward the Islamic Republic speaks to its “structural pragmatism rather than any fundamental reassessment of Iranian intentions,” according to Khalid Almezaini, associate professor of politics and international relations at Zayed University and coeditor of An Introduction to Gulf Politics.
In an interview with The American Conservative, he argued that Abu Dhabi’s current priority is to avoid further escalation. Almezaini noted that the UAE has long viewed the maximalist trajectory of American-Israeli military operations with caution, wary that a widening conflict could threaten the country’s economic stability, undermine its security interests, and disrupt the globally connected commercial and aviation hubs that underpin its prosperity.
“What we are seeing is less a dovish or softening turn and more a recalibration toward the UAE’s preferred default… I can describe it as managed ambiguity, back-channel communication, and preserving strategic optionality,” Almezaini told TAC.
Mira Al Hussein, a fellow at the Alwaleed Centre at the University of Edinburgh, cautions against interpreting Abu Dhabi’s public rhetoric toward Tehran as “evidence of a genuine diplomatic inclination.” In her assessment, such “statements are better understood in the same vein as the UAE’s earlier claims that it was maintaining a purely defensive posture and refusing to be drawn into the conflict, only for it to later emerge that the UAE had in fact carried out direct retaliatory strikes against Iran.”
As Al Hussein sees it, the UAE’s conciliatory messaging should therefore be viewed with a degree of skepticism, as public statements may not necessarily reflect the full scope of Abu Dhabi’s calculations or actions. “The UAE is likely managing its public messaging carefully so as not to further antagonize Iran, particularly given its geographic vulnerability across the Gulf and its greater exposure to any regional escalation,” she told TAC.
Since the first day of the war, the UAE has borne the brunt of Iran’s missile and drone attacks among the GCC states. While Iran alleges that military bases in the UAE were used in the launch of Operation Epic Fury on February 28, a claim denied by Emirati officials, the conflict has nevertheless reinforced Abu Dhabi’s decades-old perceptions of Iran as a predatory actor. Consequently, the war is likely to leave a lasting imprint on Emirati strategic thinking, heightening the UAE’s security concerns about the Islamic Republic.
For Al Hussein, Iran’s attacks on the UAE make it difficult to envision Emiratis soon forgetting or forgiving Tehran’s actions amid this war. “Abu Dhabi is unlikely to pursue a conciliatory approach towards Iran following Tehran’s breach of the longstanding norm of mutual non-aggression, particularly given the extent to which the UAE was targeted relative to its GCC neighbors and even Israel,” she told TAC.
In her assessment, the conflict has reinforced a strategic logic in Abu Dhabi that favors limiting Iran’s ability to project power and influence. As she explained, “From Abu Dhabi’s perspective, its security interests now lie in weakening Iran’s capacity to consolidate power under the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and in encouraging conditions that keep the Iranian system preoccupied and attrited by internal strife and domestic fragmentation.”
Barring a dramatic shift in regional dynamics, the UAE is unlikely to embark on a path of reconciliation with Iran anytime soon. Rather, Abu Dhabi appears poised to move closer to Washington and Tel Aviv in pursuit of a strategy aimed at constraining the Islamic Republic’s regional influence and weakening the IRGC’s capacity to project power across the Middle East. In this sense, the UAE’s policy toward Tehran is likely to involve a continued emphasis on deterrence and containment.
According to Thomas Juneau, a professor at the University of Ottawa’s Graduate School of Public and International Affairs, the UAE’s decision to continue strengthening ties with Israel despite Israeli conduct in Gaza since October 2023 reflects a broader trajectory that is unlikely to change in the foreseeable future. While Abu Dhabi has simultaneously pursued a policy of diversifying its economic and security relationships, Juneau stressed that these efforts remain secondary to the UAE’s partnership with Washington. “The UAE is also committed to diversifying its trade and security partnerships beyond the U.S., as witnessed for example with its deepening relations with Ukraine and South Korea. But these efforts occur under the umbrella of its far more important relations with the U.S.,” he told TAC.
Almezaini concurs, observing that the UAE’s defense cooperation with the United States and Israel will probably deepen as Abu Dhabi maintains a “firm but cautious posture towards Tehran.” In his assessment, the trajectory of UAE–Iran relations remains constrained in the near term and bilateral affairs “will likely remain tense and limited in the short term, with diplomatic engagement kept to a minimum following the recent conflict.”
In the medium to longer term, however, geographic proximity and enduring economic imperatives may gradually incentivize the UAE to pursue a measured and pragmatic course toward limited deescalation, particularly should Tehran offer concessions on both nuclear and non-nuclear issues that align with Abu Dhabi’s security and economic priorities.
“Overall, I believe the UAE is moving from a strategy of hedging towards a more explicit balancing approach vis-à-vis Iran, while keeping the door open for future stabilization should regional conditions improve,” concluded Almezaini.
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