Despite being subjected to one of the most intensive bombing campaigns in modern history, the Islamic Republic of Iran has thus far failed to yield to any of the United States’ demands. There has been no regime change; no compromise on enrichment or the nuclear issue more broadly; no acceptance of conventional disarmament or an end to the so-called “axis of resistance;” and no let-up of Iran’s chokehold over the Strait of Hormuz.
And that, a July assessment by America’s intelligence community reportedly says, is unlikely to change.
According to a recent article in the Washington Post, our own spy agencies recognize that the government in Tehran has demonstrated “staying power,” despite the assassination of its top leaders and the destruction of many of its conventional capabilities. The assessment suggests that a new round of American military strikes won’t lead Tehran to “soften its negotiating position.”
Others in Trump’s orbit have raised concerns, too. As the New York Times reported late last month, when a new escalation was being considered:
Few if any in Mr. Trump’s inner circle believed the plan to escalate was wise, said the two people briefed. One senior U.S. official, who also spoke on the condition of anonymity, expressed doubts that resuming major combat operations would drive Iran back to the bargaining table… The official said the strikes have the opposite effect of what is intended, keeping Iran cohesive and allowing Iranian leaders to focus attention on an external threat.
The war does indeed seem to have achieved “the opposite effect of what is intended.”
Beyond failing to deliver victory, U.S. operations against Iran have also eaten through munitions and undermined the military’s broader readiness. Although the U.S. likely still has enough weapons to continue strikes, a return to major combat operations would, as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Gen. Dan Caine reportedly told the president, dangerously deplete stockpiles of some of the military’s most important munitions, including the interceptors necessary to defend against Iranian counterattacks. America’s regional bases and personnel—not to mention our allies’ civilian infrastructure and populations—would then be dangerously exposed.
The value of escalation is also in question because Iran had been willing to make certain nuclear concessions before the war.
Iran was reportedly willing to submit to rigorous inspections, dilute its stockpile of 60 percent–enriched uranium, cease high-level enrichment, cap enrichment at 3.67 percent, compatible with a civilian energy program, and potentially even suspend all but token nuclear enrichment for three to five years before joining a regionally managed consortium.
Then there is the Strait of Hormuz—which, let’s recall, was entirely open before the war. Now Iran has effectively shut it, and we are likely to see some form of tolling or fee assessment structure if we ever make it to the other side of this conflict.
Unfortunately, there are few signs this is winding down.
The war zone has expanded far beyond the Persian Gulf: U.S. bases in Jordan have become increasingly common targets for Iran, whose missiles and drones have killed U.S. military personnel, damaged residential facilities, and destroyed military equipment. At the end of July, American and Saudi fighter jets struck “Iranian-backed militias” in Iraq who are (according to Washington and Riyadh) responsible for drone attacks on Saudi energy infrastructure. And for the first time, Egypt was struck by a drone that caused a fire on two ships, one of which was a U.S.-owned gas storage tanker (though Iran has denied responsibility, and Egypt has not stated Iran is responsible).
The Iran War has also reignited conflict between the Houthis and Saudi Arabia, and led the Houthis to close the Bab al-Mandeb Strait to Saudi shipping.
Perhaps most combustibly, last week there appeared to be a serious possibility of the merger of the turmoil in the Middle East with the Ukraine War. On July 25, just days before Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky met Trump in the White House, Ukraine struck an Iranian ship in the Caspian Sea.
Iran’s foreign minister, Abbas Araghchi, told EU foreign policy chief Kaja Kallas and Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov that the strike “cannot go unanswered,” risking widening the war in an unexpected and dangerous direction.
Zelensky’s reckless attempt to draw the U.S. directly into the Ukraine War fell short. Following Iran’s threat to retaliate, Ukraine’s foreign minister initiated a “frank conversation” with Iran’s foreign minister, emphasizing “the necessity to refrain from any escalatory steps,” since Ukraine “never intended to target civilian vessels.” Iran was reassured and demanded “restitution” instead of retribution.
But Zelensky is also working to get America into his war by telling Trump that Russia is helping Iran target U.S. forces and facilities. Of course, if this is true, the U.S., with its sprawling intelligence apparatus, probably does not need Ukraine to tell it that (and indeed, reporting from March shows that Washington has known of this possibility for some time).
Trump has seemed to recognize the dangers of getting overly involved in Ukraine’s war, and Zelensky left the White House without getting the involvement he sought.
But the president should apply that realism to his own conflict with Iran.
It should be amply clear by now that the Iran War has been a strategic disaster for the United States. Washington lacks any compelling reason to continue this fight—and increasingly appears to lack the means as well. As I write, it appears that there is once again a short window for peace negotiations. Such opportunities have been wasted before. Hopefully, this one will be seized.
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