If the world blows up in a conflict over Kaliningrad—the diminutive Russian exclave sandwiched between Poland, Lithuania, and the Baltic Sea—at least there would be a silver lining for survivors to appreciate: It would be darkly humorous and ironic.
Kaliningrad—or Koenigsberg, as the formerly German city was called before its capture in 1945 by the Soviet Union—was the birthplace of the philosopher Immanuel Kant, whose most enduring contribution to political theory was a long essay on international relations, Toward Perpetual Peace. In it, Kant outlines some big-brained ideas that governments should implement to not only end active hostilities but create the political conditions for, well, perpetual peace.
Old Kant published that hopeful essay 231 years ago and would certainly be disturbed and disappointed by this week’s headlines. The most riveting came from the New York Post: “Moscow threatens nuclear response over tiny fortress wedged between US allies as clash fears grow.” (The Post really has a knack for this kind of thing, doesn’t it?)
The one from the Associated Press more aptly, if less dramatically, described the latest development. “Russia warns NATO of a possible nuclear response if Kaliningrad is cut off,” it blared.
So, what’s got the Russians so worked up? Top Russia experts told The American Conservative that Moscow assigns profound strategic significance to the exclave and perceives a Western threat against it.
“Kaliningrad gives Russia another warm water port on the Baltic Sea,” said Thomas Graham, a fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations and former White House expert under President George W. Bush. “It also holds major military assets to defend Russia’s interest in the region, including access routes to St. Petersburg.”
Anatol Lieven of the Quincy Institute noted an even more straightforward Russian interest than that. “Russia cares about this because it is internationally-recognized Russian national territory,” Lieven said. “Any attack on it or blockade is therefore legally an act of war against the Russian Federation, to which the Russian government would have to respond or face deep humiliation.”
Those are important points with which few experts would quibble. But what really distinguishes Graham and Lieven is their ability to discern—from Russia’s point of view—a Western threat against Kaliningrad, and to take it seriously. Judging by the comments both men provided, Russia’s President Vladimir Putin didn’t issue the nuclear threats lightly.
“In some NATO countries there has been talk of blockading Kaliningrad, that is, isolating the region from the rest of Russia by land and sea,” Graham said. “Putin would see a blockade as an act of war against Russia. So he is making sure that Europe understands that he will defend Russian land with all necessary means, which could include nuclear weapons.”
Moscow had already been inclined, even before the latest tensions exploded between Russia and the West, to view Kaliningrad as exposed to NATO’s predations. “NATO expansion to Poland, Lithuania, Sweden, and Finland means that Kaliningrad is now surrounded by NATO countries both by land and sea,” Lieven noted.
Sadly, not all Western experts perform such acts of perspective taking. Consider a recent article in The Hill, which, in the view of this editor-cum-columnist at least, actually brought the week’s most disturbing headline: “Kaliningrad is just Putin’s red herring.”
The coauthors—Mark Toth and Jonathan Sweet—write that the Kremlin is engaged in “nuclear bluffing” designed to intimidate the West and distract from its own military failures in Ukraine. Early in the piece, the only context they provide for Moscow’s warnings is a new British television miniseries called The Wargame, in which the UK launches retaliatory strikes on Kaliningrad after a Russian attack.
A casual reader of their article could be left with the impression that this TV show was the main thing, perhaps the only thing, motivating Putin’s threatening rhetoric. But a careful reader would learn otherwise, for the authors inadvertently illuminate the kinds of Western behavior that prompted Putin’s warnings.
“Kaliningrad is a hollowed-out shell of what it was before Russia’s invasion of Ukraine,” they write. “As Polish Foreign Minister Radosław Sikorski pointed out earlier this month, ‘There are hardly any [Russian] troops [in the Kaliningrad exclave].’”
But that’s not all that Sikorski said. Toth and Sweet link to an article in Defense News, the first sentence of which is this:
NATO allies could hold drills in proximity of Russia’s Kaliningrad exclave in an attempt to push Moscow to weaken its military posture in Ukraine and withdraw some of its troops there, said Radosław Sikorski, Poland’s deputy prime minister and foreign minister.
Clearly, Sikorski went far beyond merely commenting on Russia’s force posture in the region. The article emphasizes that he didn’t recommend “offensive” actions against Kaliningrad, but you could hardly blame Putin for failing to appreciate the distinction. Indeed, in the relevant quotes, Sikorski recommends that NATO “aggressively” exercise around Kaliningrad and start treating the exclave as a front in the confrontation between Russia and the West.
Toth and Sweet’s article continues: “Although Kaliningrad is still the headquarters of the Russian Baltic Fleet, the Baltic Sea itself has effectively become a NATO-controlled lake, after the accession of Sweden and Finland as the newest members of NATO.” Kaliningrad, they write, “is highly vulnerable,” and these days it merely hosts nuclear missiles, its conventional forces having been deployed to Ukraine.
Thus, “Moscow’s nuclear Armageddon bluffing is simply the latest attempt by Putin and his Kremlin cronies to paper over this problem.”
Here the premises lead to the conclusion only in the sense that they crash violently into it. If an increasingly vulnerable Kaliningrad holds strategic value for Russia and can only be defended by nuclear weapons, then perhaps Western leaders shouldn’t threaten it—and perhaps Western analysts should take more seriously Moscow’s repeated warnings that such threats could meet a nuclear response.
And those analysts should understand that the Russian political establishment in general—not just Putin—perceives a Western threat against Kaliningrad that, if acted upon, could precipitate a devastating Russia–NATO conflict. Referring to Sikorski’s apparent suggestion that NATO might isolate the exclave, forcing its surrender, Lieven said, “If this did happen, every Russian with whom I have spoken has said that Russia would have credibly to threaten the use of nuclear weapons, followed by their actual use if NATO failed to back down.”
Tensions between Russia and the West are worse than they’ve been since the Cold War, and mutual understanding perhaps worse than even then. In our age, Kant’s dreams of perpetual peace may seem naive if not delusional, but surely our leaders have enough wisdom not to let inexcusable miscalculations over his homeland on the Baltic lead to nuclear war. Right?
Read the full article here
